Article 6 is often discussed from the perspective of buyers, whether it be airline operators, procuring entities e.g. Klik Foundation, or governments in Japan under the JCM, Switzerland under the CO2 Act or Singapore under the International Carbon Credit (ICC framework). In both cases, entities are seeking to leverage cost-effective cooperation under Article 6 to meet their CORSIA offsetting obligations or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Less attention is paid to the other side of the deal: the host governments in developing countries who hold the authorization power and, with it, a significant but largely unrealized revenue opportunity. Our May 2026 report on the Article 6 market estimates that host governments could collectively generate between $144M and $204M from current bilateral supply pipelines, rising to $1B-$1.26B when projections from high-readiness countries are included. The catch: most governments still lack the statutory fee structures needed to systematically capture this value.
The host country perspective: why authorization power matters in Article 6
At its core, the success of Article 6 will rely on host party government decisions. Which activities meet the environmental and social safeguards to receive authorization? Which vintages will receive a corresponding adjustment? Does the country have a robust emissions trajectory and accounting mechanism to apply corresponding adjustments, and still meet their NDC targets?
Before a single ITMO can be transferred, a government must issue a Letter of Authorization (LoA), confirm that the mitigation activity is additional to its NDC, and apply a corresponding adjustment (CA) to its national emissions inventory. That final step is what gives ITMOs their compliance-grade integrity, and it cannot happen without explicit host country consent.
The pipeline-to-delivery gap: why political intent has outpaced operational execution
This gatekeeping function has real consequences. As of May 2026, 128 bilateral agreements have been signed, yet only five transactions have been completed, with just 65,000 ITMOs transferred, 77% of which came from a single bus project in Bangkok. The pipeline-to-delivery ratio is stark: political intent has significantly outpaced operational execution.
Ghana has emerged as the clearest model of what proactive host country engagement looks like. It was the first country to launch an Article 6 framework, develop a national carbon market registry, authorize a project, and submit an initial report to the UNFCCC's centralized accounting and reporting platform. Its Carbon Markets Office now has 54 mitigation projects under development, with cooperative approaches agreed with Switzerland, Sweden, Singapore, and South Korea. For other host governments still on the sidelines, Ghana's approach offers a practical template.
Fee structures: how host governments capture revenue from Article 6 transactions
In this report, we highlight two channels host governments can generate revenue from Article 6 transactions: ITMO transaction fees charged to project developers, and benefit-sharing provisions that direct a portion of carbon revenues to communities or the national treasury.
A handful of governments have published clear frameworks. Ghana's Carbon Market Framework sets ITMO fees at $3-$5 per ton, was both an early policy signal and the most frequently cited benchmark in the current market. Rwanda revised its revenue-sharing tiers through Ministerial Instruction MI No. 001/Moe/26, introducing tiered rates that adjust with transaction volume. Bhutan similarly operates a volume-tiered approach. Kenya's Climate Change (Carbon Markets) Regulations, 2024, require project proponents seeking authorization for international transfer to pay a corresponding adjustment fee, with corresponding adjustments applied to all such authorizations to ensure no double counting. However, across the majority of countries with Article 6 authorized or
In the absence of published rates, our analysis applies an average of available CA fees, adjusted for the OMGE (2%) and SOP (5%) cancellation requirements set out in the Oxford Principles for Responsible Engagement with Article 6, meaning a portion of every ITMO transfer is cancelled without use, slightly reducing host country revenues but improving overall environmental integrity.
The pattern that's emerging is that early movers are iterating: Rwanda has already revised its initial framework upward, and the report notes this as a trend, governments that enter early tend to refine their fee structures as bilateral negotiations mature and market prices become better understood.
The numbers: how much can host governments generate from Article 6?
Putting numbers on the host country revenue opportunity is what makes the current moment particularly striking. Our analysis across 31.2 million potential ITMOs spanning 18 government pairs estimates total host government revenues of between $144M and $204M under current bilateral supply pipelines, applying low ($15/t), medium ($20/t), and high ($25/t) price scenarios against published or draft fee structures.
Ghana dominates the picture. With the Ghana-Switzerland corridor alone accounting for approximately 12.1 million potential ITMOs and ITMO fees of $3-$5/t, Ghana's potential returns range from $45M to $75.8M, dwarfing every other host country in the bilateral pipeline. The next tier includes Cambodia ($2M-$4.7M), Chile ($2.8M-$4.7M), and the Philippines ($2.6M-$4.3M), each with active bilateral agreements and without published or draft fee structures. All other countries combined account for $17.1M. These figures represent floor revenues under current frameworks. As bilateral negotiations mature and fee structures are revised upward, as Rwanda has already demonstrated, the ceiling rises. Our projections for high-readiness countries, assessed on the basis of institutional capacity, registry infrastructure, and pipeline volume, put the total opportunity at $1B-$1.26B.
Buying signals: the capital already looking for Article 6 supply
The buyer side confirms the scale of demand. Norway has prepared to purchase ITMOs for up to $740M from Benin, Jordan, Senegal, and Zambia alone, a figure that underlines the mismatch between available buyer capital and the supply that host countries are currently able to authorize. Nigeria's Carbon Market Activation Policy (NCMAP) projects unlocking a carbon market worth between $736 million and $2.5 billion by 2030, alongside between 600,000 and 2.3 million green jobs. Whether or not those figures prove realistic, they reflect growing governmental awareness that Article 6 can be an effective climate and economic mechanism.
Why getting the fee structure right, early, is the most consequential policy choice of the next 24 months
The revenue case for host country participation in Article 6 is no longer theoretical. The numbers exist, the bilateral pipelines are forming, and buyer capital, from Switzerland's KliK Foundation to Norway's government procurement programmes, is actively looking for supply. What's missing, for most host governments, is the institutional architecture to capture it.
The countries that have moved early, Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, are already iterating on their frameworks, revising fee structures upward, and building registries capable of issuing and tracking ITMOs. The countries that haven't yet formalized their approach are not simply leaving money on the table; they risk becoming recipients of demand that flows to better-prepared jurisdictions instead.
Article 6 authorization decisions are sovereign and irreversible in the sense that they determine which emissions reductions count toward whose targets. Getting the fee structure right, early, is one of the most consequential policy choices a host government can make in the next 24 months.
The full findings, including country-level revenue projections, bilateral pipeline data, and fee structure analysis across 18 government pairs, are available to download here.